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Introduction 
While recognizing the value of productive work, some social theorists call for the end 
of wage-based work because of its exploitative nature (e.g. Gorz, 1999). In parallel 
with such arguments, this chapter suggests that it is not work itself that needs to be 
eliminated, but the way in which it is organized and the conditions in which it is 
conducted. Elaborating on the relationship between work and affect, the chapter 
shows how work can in fact be a route to freedom. It contributes by recasting both 
freedom and work as psychosocial processes and thereby demonstrating the 
empowering and transformative potentials of work.  
 
I begin by briefly reviewing the sociological and critical management literature that 
show how freedom at work is hampered through mechanisms of control that, 
ironically, appeal to workers’ self-images and aspirations for freedom. I then 
introduce some terminology from Lacanian psychoanalysis, before briefly illustrating 
how scholars have utilized Lacan’s theory of identification to advance our 
understanding of control. Subsequently, I illustrate the two ways in which Lacan’s 
theory helps to comprehend the relationship between work and freedom. First, while 
scholars have revealed the importance of the concept of identification for 
comprehending control, I emphasize that it also assists in thinking about freedom. 
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Lacan presents three dimensions of subjectivity and identification (Hook, 2011) as 
follows: symbolic (the socio-cultural and linguistic order of the Other and the source 
of recognition), imaginary (likeable body-images of ourselves derived from others) 
and real (that part of psychosocial life which is not straightforwardly accommodated 
within the symbolic and the imaginary domain). Expanding on Lacanian 
organizational scholars, I propose that freedom and emancipation should be viewed in 
psychosocial terms: as freedom from a search for recognition from the Other, and this 
is facilitated by the real in work. Second – and this is the central argument of the 
chapter – a Lacanian perspective can highlight how work can enable freedom because 
it ‘touches’ on the real. Dejours and colleagues’ clinical approach to work (Dejours, 
2007; Dejours and Deranty, 2010) also bring to light the relationship between work 
and the real. However, I show that Lacan’s more sophisticated view of the real as 
including affect is better suited to understand how work is related to freedom. I 
redefine work as a signifying, and thus psychosocial, activity that can bring about 
freedom because it can ‘treat’ (act upon) the real. Work is then related to freedom in 
two ways: first, as an activity that converges on the real, it may enable freedom from 
the pursuit of recognition. Second, as a signifying practice, it can domesticate affect 
and thus provide a measure of freedom from the real. I use an example from cinema 
to illustrate some of the theoretical points.  
 
The chapter thus contributes to organizational studies, especially to the literature that 
draws from Lacan, by advancing the understanding of the relationship between work 
and freedom. Lacanian psychoanalysis is appropriate because it lends itself well to a 
psychosocial approach (Hook, 2008). Psychosocial studies is here defined as a 
perspective that aims to challenge the opposition between the psychological and the 
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social by viewing these two spheres as each constituting the other (Frosh and 
Baraitser, 2008).  
Contemporary work: self-fulfilment as a vehicle of control 
Sociologists and philosophers imply that the highly competitive market-dominated 
neoliberal society has shaped the world of work in very peculiar ways. Du Gay (1996) 
claims that today’s workers are expected to become ‘entrepreneurs of the self’ by 
adapting themselves to the market principles of enterprise and pursue a project of self-
branding and self-development. Sennett (2008) implies that images of ‘talent’ and 
various forms of individual rewards seduce contemporary workers, and thus 
personality and the ego is emphasized over an engagement with the quality of work 
itself. An engagement with work is, according to Sennett (2008), what is involved in 
craftsmanship, which is defined by its “impersonal character” (p. 27). An authentic 
commitment to the concrete tasks of the work – that is, with the problems faced by 
work and with problem solving – is downplayed in a culture where the focus is on the 
self. The presentation of work as a site where the self can be cultivated echo Giddens’ 
(1991) argument that a reflexive ‘project of the self’ is a fundamental characteristic of 
modernity. It also resonates with Lasch’s (1980) claim that late capitalism produces 
individuals characterized by a pathological narcissistic structure and an incessant 
search for validation.   
 
Some critical management and organization scholars, especially those influenced by 
poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theories, repeat these sociological insights. They 
have written, for example, about the ways in which worker consent to capitalism is 
generated through ideological discourses that emphasize ‘autonomy’, ‘freedom’, 
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‘self-actualization’ or ‘empowerment’ (e.g. Casey, 1995; Willmott, 1993). Such work 
is a segment of a broader literature that focuses on the way in which ‘normative’ 
forms of control use subjectivity as its greatest weapon (see for example, Alvesson 
and Robertson, 2006; Knights and Willmott, 1989; Willmott, 1993, 1994). Control 
functions through the exploitation and manipulation of workers’ identities and self-
images (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002; Knights, 2003; Willmott, 1993, 2005). More 
recently, Fleming and Sturdy (2009; 2011) have argued that a ‘neo-normative’ mode 
of control encourages workers to ‘be themselves’ and thus produces employee 
involvement through an illusion of freedom.  
 
Drawing from Lacan’s rich vocabulary of subjectivity and identification some 
organizational theorists have gone some way in illustrating why discourses that appeal 
to worker’s aspirations for identity can manage to embrace workers. In the next 
section I explain some Lacanian terms, mainly the imaginary, the symbolic and the 
real before briefly illustrating how researchers interested in control have deployed 
these concepts.  
Control and the search for recognition 
Lacan’s theory of the subject is extremely vast and complicated and only a short and 
relatively unsophisticated review of a few of his concepts can be given here (see 
Stavrakakis (2010) for a more comprehensive overview). Lacan uses three concepts to 
illustrate the psychosocial constitution of the subject: the real, the symbolic and the 
imaginary. These three registers explicate different aspects of subjectivity, yet they 
are linked to each other in an inextricable knot.  
 
 5 
The real in Lacan is a complex notion. He variously defines it as the “the impossible” 
(Lacan, 2004: p. 167), the field which “resists symbolisation absolutely” (Lacan, 
1975, p. 66) and the re-emergence of traumatic memories or feelings (Lacan, 2004, p. 
55). The real also relates to the affective, bodily sphere which is not easily 
representable (Hook, 2011). The central tenet of later Lacan’s theory is the body as an 
enjoying substance. Jouissance – a traumatic, affective pleasure-pain experience that 
both haunts and drives the subject – is on the side of the real because it relates to the 
body and it is not easily symbolized, although symbolization is always an attempt to 
represent the real. The latter is ultimately impossible though, and so the subject 
suffers from an insurmountable lack. According to Glynos and Stavrakakis (2008, p. 
261) “when subjectivity is conceived in terms of lack ... this lack can be understood as 
a lack of jouissance”. Symbolic and imaginary identifications, as well as desire, are 
for Lacan motivated by this lack, which is the mainspring of fantasies of 
completeness and jouissance. The symbolic is the socio-discursive domain; the 
institutional and linguistic network (the province of duties, roles and obligations) and 
the values of a given culture, which determines the imaginary. The latter is the field of 
subjectivity that includes lovable, whole and coherent images of ourselves acquired 
from others. The imaginary is also the basis of aggressive, narcissistic rivalry (Lacan, 
1977). The function of symbolic and imaginary identification is to conceal lack; in 
our search for jouissance, we identify with certain images, ideals or practices in our 
culture that guarantee wholeness, such as jargons on freedom, pay packages, various 
forms of consumption practices, and other symbolic markers of status. Symbolic 
identification is at the same time driven by a “primitive need for recognition and 
love” from the symbolic Other (Alcorn, 2002, p. 40). Identification is then a psychic 
mechanism – even as it is also inherently socio-political – driven by dynamics of 
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recognition and the affective operation of jouissance (see also Dashtipour, 2012; 
Stavrakakis, 2008). 
 
Organizational theorists employ Lacan’s concepts in various different ways, but most 
of them make one key point: neoliberal market-based ideology seduces workers at an 
affective level by responding to their search for recognition and fulfillment (e.g. 
Bloom and Cederström, 2009; Ekman, 2012; Hoedemaekers, 2009; Kenny, 2012; 
Roberts, 2005). Workers identify with ideological discourses of individuality, 
grandiosity, self-development, ‘talent’ or ‘potential’ in their pursuit of recognition. 
Glynos (2008) understands discourse as the mainspring of ideological fantasies that 
stage an imaginary state of fullness and that are significant in the upholding or 
transformation of work-place practices and identities. Identification with such 
discourses is affective – hence in order to understand how workers are influenced by 
power in organizational settings, affect cannot be disregarded (Bloom and 
Cederström, 2009; Stavrakakis, 2008).   
 
In this chapter, I draw on Lacan to suggest something different to these scholars. I 
propose that Lacanian theory does not only advance our understanding of control, but 
it can also contribute to a theory of work and freedom. As will be shown below, 
freedom could be seen as existing beyond a search for recognition and imaginary 
identifications.  
Freedom as beyond recognition  
The Lacanian and other organizational literature on control risk presenting workers as 
forever trapped in incessant strivings for recognition and as little else but a product of 
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technologies of power (for a critique of the poststructuralist approaches to control, see 
for example Gabriel (1999)). This leads to the question of how to conceptualize 
freedom in ways that does not reduce it to an effect of ideology, while bearing in 
mind the hollow manner in which capitalism deploys this concept.  
 
The work of some Lacanian organizational scholars suggests that freedom should be 
viewed as linked to processes of identification and recognition. In so far as the socio-
ideological sphere animates such processes, and in so far as they create dependencies 
and various forms of socio-psychological and material enslavements and symptoms, 
freedom could be understood in terms of freedom from a search for recognition. 
Lacanian scholars have gone some way in conceptualizing a theory of freedom that is 
attentive to psychosocial dynamics of identification and recognition. They have 
capitalized on Lacan’s insistence that subjects are never fully determined by discourse 
or by the social (Stavrakakis, 2008) and that identification is never really successful. 
Roberts (2005) argues that “to document […] micro processes of self-preoccupation 
also offers sight of what such processes occlude or foreclose” (p. 638), suggesting 
thus that freedom lies in the failures inherent in identity. Similarly, Driver (2009a; 
2009b) proposes that if we recognize that identification processes in work 
organizations are inherently fragile and frequently disrupted, we can see how they can 
also create new possibilities for relating to others. By studying the gaps in workers’ 
narratives, she shows how workers draw on the dominant imaginary ‘stress’ discourse 
to construct their identities, but also to “experience themselves as powerful and free” 
(Driver, 2012, p. 1). She found liberation and emancipation in moments where 
identity broke down. Hoedemakers (2010), drawing on Lacan’s notion of the real 
(here understood as the limitations in representation), analyses failures in workers’ 
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identification with images of the ‘ideal employee’. Focusing on the limitations of 
identification, he argues, “might be a step towards collective forms of re-
signification…[which] might only be possible when entrenched meanings are first 
unsettled, and when a transcendental self is no longer presupposed” (p. 391). Glynos 
(2008) raises similar issues by discussing the possibilities of workplace subjectivities 
that transcend the logic of ideological fantasy. He argues that rather than being 
defined by an ideological logic, a more open relation to workplace practices is defined 
by an ethical logic, which “entails risking the loss of one’s identity and moving away 
from trying to capture a lost or new paradise” (Glynos, 2008, p. 19). The scholars 
imply that freedom entails being liberated from the lures of identification as 
belonging to both the realm of the imaginary illusions and the injunctions of the 
symbolic order; freedom is present in the moments that surpass the desire for 
recognition. This is the moment where the Other is realized as lacking the capacity to 
provide total fulfillment or secure identity. Freedom is then facilitated or enabled by 
the real, which is the register that makes apparent the holes in the socio-symbolic 
realm. From such a psychosocial perspective, freedom is not viewed as some 
idealized, non-subjective state. It is rather understood as a subjective experience 
firmly grounded in the psychosocial world in which the subject exists.  
 
We have so far stated that freedom can be viewed as freedom from a search for 
recognition and this is enabled by the real. But what precisely is this real? I propose 
that there is a ‘real’ to the concrete practice of work that can enable freedom from 
imaginary identifications. This is in contrast to some Lacanian organizational theorists 
who state that “work is nothing but work” (Arnaud and Vanheule, 2007, p. 363). 
Although I agree with Arnaud and Vanheule that work may not ultimately address the 
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lack of the subject, my claim is that it can permit the subject to acknowledge the lack 
in the Other and relinquish a search for recognition and identity. Freedom, then, can 
be found through work, in so far as it relates to the activity of ‘doing’ and therefore 
surpasses a preoccupation with ‘being’. This entails an affective investment in the 
activity of work – its problems and solutions – rather than with the ‘self-images’ 
associated with work. This notion parallels with the perspective of French psychiatrist 
and psychoanalyst Christophe Dejours and his colleagues who are part of the 
‘psychodynamics of work’ movement, an approach that has been developed in the last 
40 years in the Centre National des Art et Métiers. One of their most valuable 
arguments is that recognition can be viewed in at least two ways: a) recognition 
connected to the social status of work, and b) recognition of the actual work done by 
the worker (Dejours and Deranty, 2010). They imply that the latter form of 
recognition, founded on the ‘doing’, rather than the ‘being’ of the subject, is “based 
on the quality of the relationship that the worker has maintained with the “real”” (p. 
172). The real refers to the “obstructing materiality” (Dejours and Deranty, 2010, p. 
171) entailed in actual work. In other words, to realize a concrete work task, the 
subject confronts problems and interruptions that need to be overcome and this is 
fundamentally an affective experience. Before explaining Dejours’s notion of the real 
and its limitations in more detail, we first need to clearly define what we mean by 
work.  
What is work? 
Different academic disciplines have very different understandings of what work is. 
Work defined as a wage contract is common in the literature. Some also view work or 
labour as historical categories with changing meanings (Rössel, 2007). Sayers (2005), 
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however, implies that Marx remains one of the few philosophers who have 
commented at length on the human aspect of work. He stresses that for Marx, work is 
an exclusively human activity that shapes the material and social world. Marx 
strongly advocates work as a formative activity and views it as a route to freedom 
(Sayers, 1998, chapter 4). Marx, following Hegel, insists that by working on and 
transforming the natural world we come to recognize our powers because we see 
ourselves in the product of our work; we objectify ourselves and get to know 
ourselves in our activity and work.  
 
Taking these ideas into consideration means that work is not purely a political 
category (see Fleming and Mandarini, 2011). Dejours and Deranty suggest the 
following definition of work, drawn from the feminist sociologist Danièle Kergoat. 
Kergoat (2001) states that 
by work, we do not just mean waged labour or work as a profession, but rather 
work as ‘production of life’…this concept of work includes not just professional 
work (whether paid or unpaid, market or non-market, formal or informal), but 
also domestic work (in Dejours and Deranty, 2010, p. 173).  
Dejours and his colleagues use this definition but they also expand on it, deploying 
their clinical perspective. What is useful about their clinical viewpoint is that it brings 
attention to the psychosocial and subjective nature of working:  
Work is what is implied, in human terms, by the fact of working: gestures, 
know-how, the involvement of the body and the intelligence, the ability to 
analyse, interpret, and react to situations. It is the power to feel, to think, and to 
invent. In other words, for the clinician, work is not above all the wage relation 
or employment but ‘working’, which is to say, the way the personality is 
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involved in confronting a task that is subject to constraints (material and social) 
(Dejours, 2007, p. 72). 
Work is from this perspective not understood in abstract non-subjective, non-material 
ways. Rather, it is viewed as the practice of working – or we could also say 
organizing – an action on the environment that requires bodily effort and the 
deployment of subjectivity. Barley and Kunda (2001) argue that organization studies 
has focused too much on abstract theorizing and needs to return to the question of 
what work is, that is, the concrete activities that constitute work. They raise a 
significant point, but as will be clear in what follows, to understand how work can be 
associated with freedom, we cannot neglect its psychosocial nature, that is, how work 
is simultaneously a social and a psycho-affective process. I thus follow Barley and 
Kunda in prioritizing the situated activities of work, but I divert from their perspective 
by paying specific attention to the link between working and social and affective 
dynamics. The latter cannot be simply ‘observed’, but requires the introduction of 
theory. Barley and Kunda’s ‘return to work’ claim implies a focus on activities and 
practices; the ‘visible’ aspect of work. But as Dejours (2007) argues, “the essence of 
work does not belong to the visible world” (p. 77). In particular, it is not a 
straightforward matter to observe, quantify or precisely determine the affective 
suffering entailed in concrete work activities. With affect I am here not alluding to the 
affect involved in the pursuit of symbolic recognition (Stavrakakis, 2008); in the 
subject’s search for ‘being’. Rather, following Dejours affect refers to the suffering 
associated with the real practice – the ‘doing’ – of work.  Suffering is “absolute 
affectivity” (Dejours, 2007, in Deranty, 2008, p. 452) which is integral to work.  
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Work, the real and affect 
Dejours and his colleagues offer a theory of work and subjectivity that helps to gain 
an insight into how working may be related to freedom because it touches on the real. 
Although Dejours, like Lacan, draws from Freudian theory, his use of the term real 
does not necessarily have any Lacanian connotations (Deranty, 2010, p. 184), but 
there are minor similarities between the Lacanian and Dejours’s real and I point these 
out in the next section. In this section, I illustrate Dejours’s notion of the real and how 
it helps us to begin to understand the relationship between work and affect.  
 
Dejours employs the word real to mean anything that interrupts the accomplishment 
of a work task according to given instructions. This may include fatigue, insufficient 
skills/experience or the occurrence of unexpected events (for example, breakdowns of 
machines, tools, materials and systems, or disruptions that arise due to other 
colleagues, bosses or subordinates). The real implies “the experience of the world’s 
resistance” (Dejours and Deranty, 2010, p. 171). For Dejours “to work is, first, to 
experience the real, that is to say, experience the breakdown of technical know-how” 
(Dejours and Deranty, 2010, p. 170).  Technical know-how includes formal 
knowledge and guidance about how to conduct a work task. These never manage to 
account for everything that is involved in the actual ‘doing’ of work; they always fail 
to capture the actual experience of work, which entails moments of interruptions and 
blockages. “There is always a gap between the prescriptive and the concrete reality of 
the situation…working thus means bridging the gap between prescriptive and 
concrete reality” (Dejours, 2007, p. 72). Dejours suggests that work consist of two 
different dimensions. The first is the social demands, instructions and prescriptions 
and the second is the objective world, which manifests itself as “resistance of the real” 
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(Deranty, 2008, p. 452). Work is a subjective activity that aims to overcome this 
resistance and close the gap between the prescriptive and objective reality. In short, 
the notion of the real used here is any material or social force that “exerts resistance to 
the accomplishment of a task” and almost all types of work entails this resistance 
(Deranty, 2008, p. 451). 
 
In order to complete a task – or to put it more precisely, in order to conquer the 
resistance – the subject needs to apply effort. This subjective investment demanded by 
work is an affective experience: the confrontation with the real involves an “affective 
suffering” (Dejours, 2007, in Deranty, 2008, p. 452). Deranty (2008) states that work 
“always tests the subject’s capacities, it touches precisely the essential vulnerability of 
the human agent” (p. 451-452). This formulation of work goes beyond common 
definitions of work as a socio-economic contract, and designates it as first and 
foremost a subjective and affective process. The real implies that the subject will at 
first fail to accomplish a work task according to the prescribed manuals and this 
causes affective suffering. But to overcome suffering, failure must be experienced 
intimately; the worker must ‘own’ its failure, and come to terms with it. This is a 
repetitive process, of failing and starting again. This repetition produces  
an intimate familiarization with the reality of work, via an obstinate, bodily 
confrontation with the obstructing materiality defining the reality of the task at 
hand: with the tools, the technical objects and rules, but also the inter-personal 
condition framing the task (with the clients, the other colleagues, the hierarchy). 
As a result, the determination to find a way, to fail and yet start all over again, 
which is the necessary condition for the realization of the task, is also a way of 
touching the world, in a direct physical sense as well as in the metaphorical 
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sense of getting to know it better, and thus of appropriating it (Dejours and 
Deranty, 2010, p. 171).  
The attempt to overcome the suffering entailed in work, if successful, results in the 
“subjectivation of the real of work” (Dejours and Deranty, 2010, p. 170). This 
requires the deployment of subjective capacity: an inventive ‘practical intelligence’. 
Affective suffering is over once ‘ideas’ are invented that enable the subject to find a 
solution to the problems faced by work.  If the real of work is too powerful, which can 
be due to technological impediments or to social and organizational factors (excessive 
expectations, for example), then the subject will remain suffering. But if the real is not 
too obtrusive, then work can lead to the expansion of new subjective powers. “We can 
say that the embodied confrontation with the real of work allows the subject to 
appropriate not just the world, but also its own body and thus itself” (ibid, p. 171).  
 
The value of Dejours’s theory is that it shows how work is fundamentally an affective 
encounter with the real, and this highlights the transformative potential of work: 
overcoming affective suffering is an emancipatory experience. But Dejours adopts a 
restricted definition of the real: as the obstacles and difficulties that the subject has to 
confront while carrying out a task. While this is undoubtedly a valuable insight, the 
notion of affective suffering and how the subject can overcome it are insufficiently 
theorized. Dejours’s theory implies that affective suffering is on the side of the 
subject, while the register of the real is not. The real is rather the force of the 
objective. The subject appropriates the real (as the ‘resistance of the world’) as he or 
she overcomes suffering. To arrive at a better understanding of how work may be a 
route to freedom, however, we need a more advanced theory of the real. While 
Dejours does mention that peer recognition of the subject’s work (the practical 
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intelligence and the creativity deployed to perform a task) is necessary for the 
overcoming of suffering, it is unclear what precisely ‘practical intelligence’ is. I 
suggest that Lacan’s more expansive theory of the real helps to address these 
limitations and advance our understanding of work and freedom.  
Work as domestication of affect 
The main contributions of Lacan’s notion of the real are the following: First, the real 
for Lacan entails affect, which is a factor at the level of the body, escaping full 
incorporation into language. Second, Lacan understands the real as in a dialectical 
relationship with the symbolic. Third, the real – although it is a universal feature of 
human life – is also very specific to each individual’s traumatic history. I elaborate on 
each of these in what follows.  
 
The Lacanian real refers to that which resists symbolization. In some ways, this 
parallels with Dejours’s notion of the real as presenting a gap between prescriptive 
and concrete reality in work. But the Lacanian perspective would designate the 
‘prescriptive’ as the operation of the symbolic – that element of work that has been 
put into representation and been made comprehensible or manageable – and this helps 
to shed more light on what precisely is the real in work. The real is thus the concrete 
problems, puzzles or situations that subjects are confronted with at work and that are 
not symbolized. For example, a doctor deals with disease, a cleaner tackles dirt, and a 
researcher is faced with a research enigma. In all types of work, there is thus an 
element that escapes the field of symbolic meaning or comprehension. The object of 
work, which is that which the subject confronts while working, resists symbolization. 
Although it is the object or the aim of work, it is not necessarily part of the ‘objective 
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world’, completely external to the subject. As that which escapes the symbolic, the 
real is both objective and subjective (Stavrakakis, 2007 p. 69). The The real is 
therefore also the affective suffering experienced by the subject at work. For Lacan, 
the realm of affect is simultaneously a subjective and objective element, and in 
contrast to Dejours, it clearly belongs to the real because affect is essentially beyond 
the symbolic. Affect for Lacan (as opposed to emotion) is real in the sense that it is on 
the side of the drive and cannot be directly represented in language, even though we 
continuously try to domesticate or organise the excessive elements of affect by giving 
it a meaning, putting it in a symbolic space (Shepherdson, 2008; see also Hook, 
2011). Affect indicates the brute materiality of bodily or traumatic experience, which 
simultaneously thrills and pains the subject. This suggests that affect and jouissance 
should be seen as synonymous because as Fink (1999) states: “where there is affect, 
there is jouissance” (p. 212). Work touches on the real, precisely because it deals with 
something that is beyond symbolic meaning and which engenders real affective 
suffering in the subject. The real is therefore not necessarily something that exists in 
the objective world, and which the subject then appropriates, which Dejours and his 
colleagues seem to suggest. Rather, work brings about a situation where the subject 
gets in touch with the real as something that resist symbolization and produces real 
jouissance.   
 
Despite being non-symbolizable, the Lacanian real is thus always understood in 
relation to the symbolic. The symbolic is the storehouse or the ‘treasury’ of signifiers 
(Lacan, 1977). Signifiers are fundamental in human beings’ relations to the world and 
they facilitate our relationship to the real; they help to give order and coherence to the 
real and assist in making sense of the incomprehensible. Work, which is a habitual, 
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social and organizational action, should be understood as a symbolic, signifying 
practice. The bodily and mental practices of work are signifying practices; they carry 
and produce meanings. Lacan states that praxis “places man in a position to treat the 
real by the symbolic” (2004, p. 6). In as much it involves language and practice – that 
is, the symbolic – work is a way of ‘treating’ the real, which is to say that it aims to 
make sense of it and abate affective suffering. Dejours’s notion of ‘practical 
intelligence’ should be understood as symbolic resources, which are the skills, 
concepts and experiences that the worker draws from the socio-cultural world while 
working. It is thus the symbolic that enables the overcoming of what Dejours calls 
failure (the real). From a Lacanian perspective then, what inhibits the overcoming of 
suffering is not the excessive force of the real, but inadequate symbolic resources or a 
damaging symbolic environment. This may include inadequate technology, an 
excessively competitive environment and unreasonable images of success. 
Organizational factors or the organizational context are thus equal to the symbolic 
environment or symbolic resources that are at the subject’s disposal. To put it simply: 
the symbolic organizational context can either facilitate or frustrate the subject’s 
attempt to overcome real affective suffering involved in work. In an enabling 
symbolic environment, work – as a signifying practice – may domesticate (overcome 
or manage) real affective suffering and may bring about a measure of freedom from 
the real. But how precisely is work capable of this?  
 
First, work involves organization, communication and socialization. These are the 
operation of signifiers, and we know from Lacan that signifiers are an attempt to 
represent the real or the impossible. Thus, organization, communication and 
socialization are attempts to symbolize the real and thereby convert feelings of 
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impossibility into possibility, finitude into infinitude, limitation into potential. This is 
one of the ways in which work can be understood as intimately related to freedom 
because it manipulates the real as the impossible. It articulates the impossible and thus 
turns it into the possible. Work entails crafting, maintaining or transforming structure 
in the field of affect; it involves an attempt to form the real via signifiers. The 
argument here is not that work can symbolize the real in its entirety because this is 
unachievable. The real is unrepresentable, but this does not mean that subjects stop 
attempting to put it into representation. This is precisely the function of clinical 
psychoanalysis, which – using speech as its technique – “is a means of working on the 
real with symbolic means” (Shepherdson, 2008, p. 96). Second, work may entail the 
domestication of anxiety, which is, for Lacan, the affect of the real. Most types of 
work, even housework, are organized, in the sense that they involve a number of tasks 
that are prioritized and timed, and this order may help ‘manage’ anxiety. Non-work or 
inactivity, for example, can cause anxiety partly because the subject is in this 
condition confronted with the real of time: with time as unstructured. Work is a means 
through which the subject can structure – and thus endure – the real of time. It can 
therefore establish a ‘sense of order’ and a time structure, the absence of which is 
often felt as a major cause of anxiety for the unemployed (Hayes and Nutman, 1981). 
Given that work involves symbolic and signifying practices, it also affords subjects a 
means of ‘domesticating’ the affects caused by trauma. Trauma is very specific to 
each individual’s biographical history and it implies affects (jouissance) that keep 
reappearing and that create a blockage for the subject (Lacan, 2004). This point is 
explained further in the example below.  
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Work, the psychosocial and film 
To illustrate some of the points above more concretely it helps to use an example 
from cinema. This approach follows other scholars who view fiction and popular 
culture as valuable resources for organizational studies (Czarniawska, 1999; Höpfl, 
2002; Islam and Zyphur, 2006; Knights and Willmott, 1999; Linstead; 2003; Patient 
et al., 2003; Phillips, 1995; Rhodes and Lilley, 2012). Cultural representations contain 
widely shared meanings about work and organization (Rhodes, 2002). Cultural and 
literary representations also include a significant source of knowledge about what it is 
to be human and thus they are “an embodiment of knowledge about organizations” 
(Rhodes and Westwood, 2008, p. 5). Rhodes and Westwood (2008) emphasize that 
cultural representations do not only bring to light the values and practices of work that 
much of organization studies neglect but they can also provide access to parts of 
organizational life that researchers may find difficult to enter or experience. Indeed, 
fictional representation such as film can deepen our understanding of the affective and 
lived experience of work. Such modes of representation should be taken seriously 
especially by researchers interested in the psychosocial aspects of work, as they can 
help to comprehend how work and organization are hooked to affects, fantasies, 
desires and anxieties which are ‘hidden’, not readily evident in interviews and 
ethnographic studies. Using fiction can also avoid some ethical problems that can 
accompany the employment of psychoanalytic theory in academic research, such as 
the essentialisation, pathologisation and disempowerment of interview participants 
(see Parker, 2005, p. 108).  
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Work, affect and freedom in Sunshine Cleaning 
The film Sunshine Cleaning (2008) directed by Christine Jeffs is a story about Rose 
Lorkowski, a single mother in her thirties who suffers from a sense of 
underachievement. She is going through financial hardship, holding low-paid, 
embarrassing work as a maid, while trying to get a more respectable position in real 
estate. She needs a better job, not only to send her son to a better school, but also to 
gain recognition and approval from her previous classmates who lead successful 
middle-class lives. She is also having a love affair with Mac, a married family man 
who does not seem to have any plans to leave his wife. One day, however, Rose 
decides to jump on the opportunity to launch a crime-scene cleanup business with her 
sister, which turns out to be both lucrative and significant in helping her change her 
life. Despite the humiliating activity of cleaning up suicide and murder sites, Rose 
slowly appears more in harmony with herself.  
 
This job enabled her to gain freedom from a search for recognition. How did it 
accomplish this? The work involved a confrontation with blood, dirt and mess – this 
is a confrontation with the real: there is a materiality to blood, dirt and mess that 
brings about visceral reactions in the subject; they arouse affective suffering. Through 
work, however, Rose deploys symbolic recourses – cleaning tools, relationship with 
suppliers and other stakeholders, knowledge about biohazard removal and post-
mortem procedures and so on – to clear up the mess and thus control this affective 
reaction. This is why work should be understood as signifying, symbolic activity: 
because it functions to manage the real. But it is also symbolic because it has a 
meaningful impact on the subject beyond the immediate work situation. In Rose’s 
case, cleaning up messy spaces – and thereby managing her affective suffering as she 
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manages the physical environment – made her recognize her own bodily and mental 
powers, powers which she could transfer to – and put into use in – other areas of her 
life. This helped Rose dealing with the feeling of failure and gaining a sense of 
empowerment. Having struggled most of her adult life with a feeling of being useless 
– she says to the cleaning-supplies sales man “there is not a lot that I am good at” – 
her new job made her feel competent. But this was not a search for recognition. After 
the commencement of her business, she was able to cut herself loose from a search for 
recognition; she relinquished her desire to obtain a more high status job in the real 
estate sector to impress her previous classmates and she stopped seeking love from an 
unavailable man. In other words, the things she used to think of as sources of fullness 
began to lose their appeal. One scene in particular skillfully demonstrates how her 
work, despite being shameful and beyond offering financial security, helped her move 
beyond a search for recognition. She is at the baby-shower party of a woman with 
whom she went to high school. While arriving at the party, she seems to feel self-
conscious and inadequate when she notices the expensive-looking cars parked outside 
the house. While at the party however, this sense of unease has disappeared. This is 
apparent when a few former high school friends stare at her mockingly when she tells 
them about her job. Although at first she seems nervous about what they think, she 
then states in a calm and collected voice:  
we come into people’s lives when they have experienced something 
profound…and sad. They’ve lost somebody. You know […] And we help. In 
some small way…We help.  
But Rose’s work did not only enable a freedom from the search for recognition: it also 
helped her move beyond a traumatic past. As stated above, the real is also the re-
emergence or persistence of traumatic memories and affects. After Rose and Norah 
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begin their new work, the viewer is exposed to a series of sporadically appearing 
scenes, representing a traumatic memory, in which a much younger Rose and Norah 
find their mother dead in the bathroom, having committed suicide. These memories, 
lurking behind the events that unfold, should be interpreted as the real for Rose; they 
are the traumatic past that persist and that bring about affective suffering. The sisters’ 
job had a role to play in stirring up memories of the suicide and the affects linked to 
it; their work touched the real. This does not however get in their way. In fact, her 
work helped Rose deal with – or indeed heal – the past and the affective suffering 
associated with it. This becomes evident after their first job assignment when Rose, 
who seems unaffected by Mac’s pity for her, tells him: “It was disgusting, the smell 
was just bad. And I can’t really describe it. But you know we…we took all that stuff 
away and we made it better. You know, we made it right”. This signifying statement 
could be read as presenting her job as crucial in acting as a remedy for the recurring 
suffering caused by her trauma. Cleaning up after dead people was for Rose a 
signifying activity that touches on the real; it was a way of symbolizing, or ‘taming’, 
the affective suffering associated with her mother’s death. In some ways her work 
‘made it right’; it helped her ‘clean up after’ – and thus move on from the effects of – 
the trauma of the suicide. We can deduce that her new business enabled her to put an 
impasse or a traumatic deadlock, into articulation. Cleaning up after dead people, 
degrading as it was, signified ‘cleaning up after’ her own mother’s death; it 
represented for her a break with the past and a freedom from affective suffering. One 
can infer that each time she was exposed to death at work, her own mother’s death 
was repeated. Through her work this repetition was however incorporated within a 
signifying activity. This symbolization means that the traumatic jouissance associated 
with her mother’s death no longer ‘insisted’ in the same way; work enabled a 
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different way of relating to her suffering. Her work provided Rose a method of 
tackling the trauma head-on by helping to symbolize the previously unsymbolizable 
affects associated with it.  
Discussion and conclusion 
Rose’s work emancipated her from a search for recognition. One can object that the 
kind of emancipation that Rose seeks is different from the emancipation discussed by 
the above-mentioned organization scholars who refer to emancipation from 
oppressive discourses in work organizations. However, it is wrong to assume that 
such discourses are confined to the organizational context. As highlighted by the 
sociologists mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, images of talent, self-
actualization and success are widespread in today’s society. Such discourses call upon 
all of us to seek recognition and fulfillment by embarking on a ‘project of the self’ 
through work. We saw in the film that Rose stopped identifying with these discourses 
and this was enabled by work. The example showed that while the socio-ideological 
sphere defines work as ‘being’, the subject might find freedom by redefining work as 
‘doing’ – as an activity that deals with the real. Rose work confronted her with the 
real – with affective suffering entailed in both the immediate work situation and her 
past trauma. Through the signifying activity of work, she was able to gain a measure 
of freedom from the real. In sum, Rose’s work emancipated her from a search for 
recognition and it provided a measure of freedom from the real. This example thus 
illustrates how a Lacanian perspective can reveal the two ways in which work can 
bring about freedom.  
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The chapter has contributed to the development of new psychosocial approaches to 
work in the following ways. First, it has added to organization studies’ theorization of 
freedom by building on Lacanian perspectives to propose a psychosocial 
understanding of freedom. Freedom is the moment where the subject relinquishes a 
search for recognition and breaks free from imaginary identifications. Second, it has 
highlighted the intimate relationship between work, affect and freedom.  One 
implication of conceptualizing work as signifying activity is that it brings attention to 
the psychosocial nature of concrete work activities: in work elements from the social 
world (such as language) is deployed to structure or modify the psycho-affective 
world. This demonstrates the emancipatory potentials of work. The ideas proposed in 
this chapter concur with Barley and Kunda (2001) in claiming that we need to pay 
attention to the localized, lived realities of work. However, I claimed that to arrive at 
a more advanced understanding of how the lived realities of work are related to 
emancipation, we need to recast freedom and work as psychosocial and we need to 
take affect into consideration. Organizational literature on control points out how the 
social order defines work. This chapter nevertheless highlighted the possibility of 
freedom through the subject’s confrontation with – and domestication of – the 
affective suffering entailed in concrete work activities.   
 
By emphasizing work as a means to freedom, this chapter puts into question the idea 
that non-work may be the most radical form of freedom (see Fleming and Mandarini, 
2011). It is not necessarily work in itself that is alienating; it is the conditions under 
which it is carried out, including the discourses that oppress workers, providing them 
with empty self-images and encouraging them to search for recognition and 
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fulfillment. What is required is not an abolishment of work, but a different relation to 
it.  
 
This is not to deny that contemporary organizations limit the possibility to develop the 
type of real relation to work discussed in this chapter. It becomes difficult to find 
freedom in the activity of work when the tasks are menial or when employees are put 
under ever-increasing pressure. The claims made above acknowledge how freedom is 
either facilitated or frustrated by the socio-symbolic environment. If the environment 
encourages aggressive imaginary rivalry, the possibilities to find freedom through 
work become limited. Most of the subject’s efforts are in such circumstances invested 
in competing with others. Workers may however find freedom in the concrete activity 
of work, even within dominating circumstances. For example, rather than identifying 
with the phantasmatic enterprise discourse (Jones and Spicer, 2005) workers may 
identify with the real work entailed in enterprise. Marx recognized that work can be 
liberating even in a capitalist system; work in this system has alienated workers, yet it 
has also “meant for them an unprecedented expansion of their horizons and 
consciousness, of their social relations, of their sphere of activity and hence of their 
real freedom” (Sayers, 1998, p. 82).  
 
It may well be the case that identification with the task is more achievable in some 
lines of work than others. And we may even point to the importance of taking into 
account the questionable ethics of certain tasks. But identification with the ‘doing’ of 
work, rather than with ‘being’, may actually encourage ethical responsibility. We saw 
that when Rose shifted her energies from seeking recognition to the concrete activities 
of work, she was not only able to take responsibility for her jouissance – or her 
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‘cause’, to use Lacanian terminology – she also realized the responsibility she has 
towards others; she became attentive to the impact of her work on other people. This 
resonates with Roberts (2005) who states that  
I can identify not with who I am as the world reflects my ‘substance’ back to me 
but rather with what I do and its consequences. Such consequences are to be 
understood not reflexively in terms of the consequences of action for how I will 
be seen, but rather in terms of the consequences of my actions for others whom 
I am now willing and able to acknowledge my dependence upon and my 
unavoidable practical interdependence with. Such conduct is not defensively 
bound to the other in the way that resistance is often bound to control, but 
instead involves a radical taking rather than displacing of responsibility 
(Roberts, 2005, p. 639).  
We could thus state that by freeing subjects from imaginary identifications, work as 
‘doing’ facilitates ethical responsibility. As suggested by Dejours and Deranty (2010) 
work involves “learning to live together” (p. 175); not only because it always 
establishes, upholds or transforms social relationships, but also because it draws 
attention to the end product of concrete activities, and therefore opens up the 
possibility for workers to reflect on the impact of their work on other people. The 
challenge is how to create organizations that facilitate such reflection and how to 
encourage work that allows for the expression of subjectivity through what Sennett 
(2008) refers as the impersonal process of craftsmanship, rather than through status 
markers, such as flamboyant titles and extravagant promises about success, wealth 
and recognition. As a starting point, we may look for spaces where such work is 
already being carried out. 
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